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Abstract. In an environment in which both workers and rms undertake
match specic investments, the presence of market competition for matches may
solve the hold-up problems generated by the absence of complete contingent
contracts. In particular, this paper shows that when matching is assortative
and workers' investments precede market competition for matches investments
are constrained ecient. Ineciencies can arise in this framework as multiple
equilibria of the competition game. Only one of these equilibria is ecient
in the sense that the worker with the higher innate ability matches with the
better rm. A dierent type of ineciencies arise when rms undertake their
match specic investment before market competition. These ineciency leads
to rms under-investments. However, we show that in this case the aggregate
ineciency is small in a well dened sense independent of the market size.
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1. Introduction
A central concern for economists is the extent to which market systems are ecient.
In the idealized Arrow-Debreu model of general competitive equilibrium, eciency
follows under mild conditions, notably the absence of externalities. But in recent
years, economists have become interested in studying market situations less idealized
than in the Arrow-Debreu set-up and in examining the pervasive ineciencies that
may exist. The subject of the present paper, the \hold-up problem", is one example
of a situation that is thought to give rise to signicant ineciencies.
The hold-up problem applies when an agent making an investment is unable to
receive all the benets that accrue from the investment. The existence of the problem
is generally traced to incomplete contracts: with complete contracts, the ineciency
induced by the failure to capture benets will not be permitted to persist. In the
standard set-up of the problem, investments are chosen before agents interact and
contracts can be determined only when agents meet. Prior investments will be a
sunk cost and negotiation over the division of surplus resulting from an agreement is
likely to lead to a sharing of the surplus enhancement made possible by one agent's
investment (Williamson 1985, Grout 1984, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore
1988).
What happens if agent interaction is through the marketplace? In an Arrow-
Debreu competitive model, complete markets, with price-taking in each market, are
assumed; if an agent chooses investment ex-ante, every dierent level of investment
may be thought of as providing the agent with a dierent good to bring to the market.
If the agent wishes to choose a particular level of investment over some other, and
the \buyer" he trades with also prefers to trade with the agent in question, rather
than with an "identical" agent with another investment level, then total surplus to
be divided must be maximized by the investment level chosen: investment will be
eciently chosen and there is no hold-up problem. In this situation, the existence
of complete markets implies that agents know the price that they will receive or pay
whatever the investment level chosen: complete markets imply complete contracts.
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exist for every conceivable level of investment, irrespective of whether or not trade
occurs in such a market. But without trade, it is far-fetched to assume that agents
will believe that they can trade in inactive markets and that a competitive price will
be posted in such market.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the eciency of investments when the
trading pattern and terms of trade are determined explicitly by the interaction of
buyers and sellers. To ensure that there are no ineciencies resulting from market
power, a model of Bertrand competition is analyzed where some agents invest prior to
trade; however, this does not rule out the dependence of the pattern of outcomes on
the initial investment of any agent and the analysis concentrates on the case of a nite
number of traders to ensure this possibility. Contracts are the result of competition in
the marketplace and we are interested in the degree to which the hold-up problem is
mitigated by contracts that result from Bertrand competition. In this regard, it should
be said that we shall not permit Bertrand competition in contingent contracts; in our
analysis, contracts take the form of an agreement to trade at a particular price. We
are thus investigating the eciency of contracts implied by a simple trading structure
rather than attempting explicitly to devise contracts that help address the hold-up
problem (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 1994, N oldeke and Schmidt 1995, Maskin
and Tirole 1999, Segal and Whinston 1998, e.g.).
To further tie our hands, we will restrict attention to markets where the Bertrand
competitive outcome is robust to the way that markets are made to clear. Speci-
cally, we assume that buyers and sellers can be ordered by their ability to generate
surplus with a complementarity between buyers and sellers. This set-up gives rise to
assortative matching in the quality of buyers and sellers. With investment choices,
the quality of sellers and/or buyers is assumed to depend on such investments.
With Bertrand competition, there is an asymmetry between buyers and sellers in
a market. As a convention, we assume that buyers bid for the right to trade with
sellers by naming a price that they wish to receive.
We rst consider a world in which only buyers' quality depends on their ex-ante
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that buyers' investment choices are constrained ecient. In particular, for given
equilibrium match, a buyer bids just enough to win the right to trade with a seller
and, if he were to have previously enhanced his quality and the value of the trade
by extra investment, he would have been able to win the right with the same bid, as
viewed by the seller, and so receive all the marginal benets of the extra investment.
The constraints imposed on eciency are given by the matches that are observed
in equilibrium. Indeed, when the returns of investments in terms of buyers' qual-
ity are not too high it is possible that a buyer might undertake a high investment
with the sole purpose of changing the seller with whom he will be matched. This
may lead to inecient equilibrium matches. Notice that, in such an environment,
hold-up problems are solved and the only ineciencies left are due to buyers' pre-
emption strategies when choosing their investments. These ineciencies may actually
disappear if the returns from investments dier enough across buyers.1
We then consider a world in which the sellers' quality depends on their ex-ante
investments. In this case we indeed show that sellers' investments are inecient.
However, the extent of the ineciency is strictly limited. In particular, we show
that the overall ineciency in a market is less than that which could result from an
under-investment by one seller in the market with all other sellers making ecient
investments. This result holds irrespective of the number of buyers or sellers in
the market. Moreover, surprisingly in this case all coordination problems are solved
and the equilibrium matches are the ecient ones. In other words, the ordering of
the sellers' qualities generated by ex-ante investments coincides with the ordering of
sellers' innate qualities.
The structure of the paper is as follows. After a discussion of related literature
in the next section, Section 3 lays down the basic model and the extensive form of
the Bertrand competition game between workers and rms. Section 4 investigates the
eciency properties of the model where workers undertake ex-ante investments before
competition occurs. We show that workers' investments are ecient given equilibrium
1For an analysis of how market competition may fail to solve coordination problems see Hart
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matches although, depending on parameters, coordination problems may arise that
lead to inecient matches. We then consider in Section 5.2 the model in which
the rms undertake ex-ante investments. It is demonstrated that the ineciency of
equilibrium investments is small and can be bounded by an amount independent of
the size of the market. Moreover, all coordination problems are solved and equilibrium
matches are ecient. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2. Related Literature
The literature on the hold-up problem has mainly analyzed the bilateral relationship
of two parties that may undertake match specic investments in isolation (Williamson
1985, Grout 1984, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1988). In other words,
these papers identify the ineciencies that the absence of complete contingent con-
tracts may induce in the absence of any competition for the parties to the match.
This literature identies the institutional (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore
1990, Aghion and Tirole 1997) or contractual (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey 1994,
N oldeke and Schmidt 1995, Maskin and Tirole 1999, Segal and Whinston 1998) de-
vices that might reduce and possibly eliminate these ineciencies. We dier from
this literature in that we do not alter either the institutional or contractual setting in
which the hold-problem arises but rather analyze how competition among dierent
sides of the market may eliminate the ineciencies associated with such a problem.
The literature on bilateral matching, on the other hand, concentrates on the inef-
ciencies that arise because of frictions present in the matching process. These inef-
ciencies may lead to market power (Diamond 1971, Diamond 1982), unemployment
(Mortensen and Pissarides 1994) and a class structure (Burdett and Coles 1997, Eeck-
hout 1999). A recent development of this literature shows how eciency can be
restored in a matching environment thanks to free entry into the market (Roberts
1996, Moen 1997) or Bertrand competition (Felli and Harris 1996). We dier from
this literature in that we abstract from any friction in the matching process and focus
on the presence of match specic investments before or after the matching process.
A small recent literature considers investments in a matching environment. SomeDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 5
of the papers focus on general investment that may be transferred across matches
and identify the structure of contracts that may lead to eciency (MacLeod and
Malcomson 1993, Holmstr om 1999) or the ineciencies due to the presence of an
exogenous probability that the match will dissolve (Acemoglu 1997). A number of
papers consider, instead, specic investments in a matching environment as we do
(Acemoglu and Shimer 1998, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 1998, de Meza and
Lockwood 1998).
In particular, Acemoglu and Shimer (1998) consider a matching model with fric-
tions. Firms post wage oers before choosing their investments. They obtain e-
ciency out of the free entry of rms and the fact that wages are announced before
investment occurs. We dier in that we do not allow free entry of rms in the econ-
omy. As a matter of fact, the nite and discrete number of rms and workers in
the market is critical in identifying the specic nature of the investment undertaken
by both sides of the market. The mechanism leading to eciency is therefore quite
dierent in nature: we focus on the ability of Bertrand competition mechanism to
achieve eciency or near-ineciency.
Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1998) is the paper closest to ours. As in our
setting they focus on ex-ante match specic investment and analyze eciency when
matches and the allocation of the shares of surplus are in the core of the assignment
game. They demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium allocation that induces e-
cient investments as well as allocations that yield ineciencies. This is done under a
critical assumption. When the numbers of workers (sellers) and buyers (rms) are dis-
crete they are able to pin down an allocation of the matches' surplus yielding ecient
investments via a condition dened as `double-overlapping'. This condition requires
the presence of at least two workers (or two rms) with identical innate characteristics;
it implies the existence of an immediate competitor for the worker or the rm in each
match. In this case, the share of surplus a worker gets is exactly the worker's outside
option and eciency is promoted. In the absence of double-overlapping, investments
may not be ecient because indeterminacy arises creating room for under-investment.
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form of market competition as Bertrand competition, we obtain a binding outside
option for any value of the workers' and rms' innate characteristics. Notice that
double-overlapping is essentially an assumption on the specicity of the investments
that both workers and rms choose. If double overlapping holds it means that invest-
ment is specic to a small group of workers or rms but among these workers and
rms it is general. We do not need this assumption for eciency.
Finally de Meza and Lockwood (1998) analyze a matching environment in which
both sides of the market can undertake match specic investments but focus on a
setup that delivers inecient investments. As a result the presence of asset ownership
and asset trading may enhance welfare as in Grossman and Hart (1986). They focus
on whether one would observe asset trading before or after investment and match
formation. In our setting, given that we obtain eciency or near-eciency, we do
not need to explore the eciency enhancing role of asset ownership. However, we do
explore the dierent eciency properties of an environment in which rms undertake
investments both before and/or after matches are formed. The dierence is that we
take this timing to be exogenously rather than endogenously determined. As we argue
in the Conclusions, Section 6 below, the only large ineciency that could arise in a
general model in which both workers and rms can undertake ex-ante and ex-post
investments is generated by the ex-post investments of the agents on the side of the
market whose remunerations are established in the employment contract.
3. The Framework
We consider a simple matching model: S workers match with T rms, we assume
that the number of workers is higher than the number of rms S > T. Each rm is
assumed to match only with one worker. Workers and rms are labelled, respectively,
s = 1;:::;S and t = 1;:::;T. Both workers and rms can make match specic
investments, denoted respectively xs and yt, incurring costs C(xs) respectively C(yt).2
The cost function C() is strictly convex and C(0) = 0. The surplus of each match is
2For simplicity we take both cost functions to be identical, none of our results depending on this
assumption. If the cost functions were type specic we would require the marginal costs to increase
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then a function of the quality of the worker  and the rm  involved in the match:
v(;). Each worker's quality is itself a function of the worker innate ability, indexed
by the worker's identity s, and the worker specic investment xs: (s;xs). In the
same way, we assume that each rm's quality is a function of the rm's innate ability,
indexed by the rm's identity t, and the rm's specic investment yt: (t;yt).
We assume positive assortative matching. In other words, the higher is the qual-
ity of the worker and the rm the higher is the surplus generated by the match:3
v1(;) > 0, v2(;) > 0. Further, the marginal surplus generated by a higher qual-
ity of the worker or of the rm in the match increases if the quality of the partner:
v12(;) > 0. We further assume that the quality of the worker depends negatively on
the worker's innate ability s, 1(s;xs) < 0 (so that worker s = 1 is the highest ability
worker) and positively on the worker's specic investment xs. Similarly, the quality
of a rm depends negatively on the rm's innate ability t, 1(t;yt) < 0, (rm t = 1
is the highest ability rm) and positively on the rm's investment yt: 2(t;yt) > 0.
We also assume that the quality of both the workers and the rms satisfy a single
crossing condition requiring that the marginal productivity of both workers and rms
investments decreases in their innate ability: 12(s;xs) < 0 and 12(t;yt) < 0.
The combination of the assumption of positive assortative matching and the single
crossing condition gives a particular meaning to the term specic investments we used
for xs and yt. Indeed, in our setting the investments xs and yt have a use and value
in matches other than (s;t); however, these values decrease with the identity of the
partner implying that at least one component of this value is specic to the match in
question, since we consider a discrete number of rms and workers.
We also assume that the surplus of each match is concave in the workers and rms
quality | v11 < 0, v22 < 0 | and that the quality of both rms and workers exhibit
decreasing marginal returns in their investments: 22 < 0 and 22 < 0. 4
3For convenience we denote with vl(;) the partial derivative of the surplus function v(;) with
respect to the l-th argument and with vlk(;) the cross-partial derivative with respect to the l-th
and k-th argument or the second-partial derivatives if l = k. We use the same notation for the
functions (;) and (;) dened below.
4As established in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1994) and Edlin andDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 8
In Section 5.2 below we need stronger assumptions on the responsiveness of rms'
investments to both the workers' quality and rms' identity and investments. These
assumptions, labelled \responsive complementarity", can be described as follows. De-
note, for a given level of worker's quality, each match surplus, net of the rm's in-
vestment cost as follows.5


















To be able to interpret these conditions, we rst need to dene the socially optimal in-
vestment choice when rm t matches with worker of given quality . This investment




and is implicitly dened by the following rst order condition:
w3(;t;y(;t)) = 0 (4)







so that (2) says that increases in s and decreases in y make investment more re-
Shannon (1998) our results can be derived with much weaker assumptions on the smoothness and
concavity of the surplus function v(;) and the two quality functions (;) and (;) in the two
investments xs and yt.
5The assumption of concavity of the surplus function v(;) in the qualities  and  and of the
function (t;) in the investment yt imply the appropriate concavity properties for the net surplus
function w(;t;), as dened in (1), in  and yt.Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 9
sponsive to the type of the investor.6 Responsiveness complementarity, and the other
conditions that we have imposed, is satised by a standard iso-elastic specication of
the model.
We analyze two dierent specication of our general framework.
We start with the analysis of a model in which only the workers choose ex-ante
match specic investments xs that determine the quality of each worker (s;xs) while
rms are of exogenously given qualities:  = (t). Then workers Bertrand compete
for the rms so as to determine the equilibrium matches and, at the same time,
the share of the match surplus accruing to each party to the match. This model is
analyzed in Section 5 below.
We then proceed to analyze (Section 5.2 below) the situation in which only rms
choose ex-ante match specic investments yt that determine each rm t's quality
(t;yt) while workers are of exogenously given quality  = (s). Then competi-
tion occurs in which, as before, workers Bertrand compete for rms and equilibrium
matches and shares of surplus are determined.
Notice that in both cases, given the absence of uncertainty, both workers and rms
can perfectly foresee the match they will end up with in equilibrium.
We assume the following extensive forms of the Bertrand competition game in
which the T rms and the S workers engage. Workers Bertrand compete for rms.
All workers simultaneously and independently make wage oers to every one of the
T rms. Notice that we allow workers to make oers to more than one, possibly all
rms. Each rm observes the oers she receives and decides which oer to accept.
We assume that this decision is taken sequentially in order of the identity (innate
ability) of rms. In other words the rm labelled 1 decides rst which oer to accept.
This commits the worker selected to work for rm 1 and automatically withdraws
all oers this worker made to other rms. All other rms and workers observe this
6As y is a function of s and t, it is not freely variable. However, if investment is subject to a
supplementary cost of p per unit then rst-order conditions give w3 = p and an interpretation of
(2) is that it is a responsiveness condition in compensated terms where p changes to induces the
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decision and then rm 2 decides which oer to accept. This process is repeated until
rm T decides which oer to accept. Notice that since S > T even rm T, the last
rm to decide, can potentially choose among multiple oers.
We choose to allow rms to select their preferred bid in order of innate ability so as
to maximize the competition among workers for rms. In other words, the extensive
form described above maximizes the depth of the active market for the match with
every rm. As shown below, a worker of a given quality has a positive willingness to
pay only for rms of a better quality than the rm he will be matched with in equi-
librium. Therefore, if the market clears rst for the low value matches the number
of workers with positive willingness to pay for high quality rms is reduced. Some of
the workers with a positive willingness to pay have exited the market since they have
been matched already. Indeed, if the order according to which rms choose their most
preferred bid is the inverse of the order of quality only two workers will compete for
every rm: the worker with whom the rm ends up matched and the lowest quality
worker that will not be matched with any rm in equilibrium. We conjecture that the
equilibrium we characterize in Sections 4 and 5.2 below is the same as the equilibrium
of the following alternative extensive form of the Bertrand competition game that en-
dogenously determines which matches clear rst. All workers submit simultaneously
and independently oers to all rms. Firms simultaneously and independently decide
which oer to accept. If a worker's oer is accepted by one rm only the worker is
committed to work for that rm. If instead the same worker oer is accepted by more
than one rm then the bidding process is repeated among the rms and workers who
are not committed to a match yet. This process continues until all rms are matched.
We look for the trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium of our model.
4. Workers' Investments
In this section we analyze the model under the assumption that the quality of rms is
exogenously give t = (t) while the quality of workers depends on both the workers'
identity (innate ability) and their match specic investments  = (s;xs). We are
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ment choices are ecient given the equilibrium matches, there may exist additional
equilibria of the workers' investment game characterized by inecient equilibrium
matches.
4.1. Equilibrium Characterization of the Bertrand Competition Game
We proceed to solve our model backward and we start from the Bertrand competition
game, as described in Section 3 above. Assume that workers' investments are chosen
so as to obtain the following order of workers' qualities: (1) > ::: > (N). Recall also
the rms' quality follows the order: 1 > ::: > T. The Bertrand competition game
then determines the equilibrium matches and the shares of the gross surplus v(;)
that accrue to the parties to the match.
We rst identify an eciency property of any equilibrium of the Bertrand game.
Equilibrium matches are ecient in the sense that in every equilibrium of the Bertrand
game the worker characterized by the k-th highest quality matches with the rm
characterized by the k-th highest. We label this property | stated and proved in the
following lemma | eciency in matching.
Lemma 1. Given an ordered vector ((1);:::;(S)) every equilibrium of the Bertrand
game is characterized by the equilibrium matches: ((k);k), for every k = 1;:::;T.
Proof: Assume by way of contradiction that this is not the case and there exist a
pair of equilibrium matches ((i);00) and ((j);0) such that i < j, or (i) > (j),
and 0 < 00. Denote B(0), respectively B(00), the bids that in equilibrium the rm
of quality 0, respectively of quality 00, accepts. For ((i);00) to be an equilibrium
match we need that it is not convenient for the worker of quality (i) to match with
the rm of quality 0, instead of 00.
Notice that if the worker of quality (i) deviates and does not submit the bid B(00)
to the rm of quality 00 a dierent worker will be matched with rm 00. Therefore,
following this deviation, when competing for rm 0 the bid that worker (i) needs to
submit to be matched with rm 0 is ^ B(0)  B(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bids submitted to rm 0 does not include the bid of the worker that matches with
rm 00 following the deviation of the worker of quality (i). Hence the maximum of
these bids, ^ B(0), is in general not higher than the equilibrium bid of the worker of
quality (i): B(0).




0)   ^ B(
0):






Moreover, for ((j);0) to be an equilibrium match we need that it is not protable
for the worker of quality (j) to outbid, at an earlier stage of the Bertrand competition













Condition (8) contradicts the assortative matching assumption v12(;) > 0.
As argued in Section 4.2 below, Lemma 1 does not imply that the order of workers'
qualities, which are endogenously determined, coincides with the order of the workers'
innate abilities.
Having established this property we can now move to the characterization of the
unique equilibrium of the Bertrand competition game.
Proposition 1. For any given ordered vector ((1);:::;(N)) the unique equilibrium
of the Bertrand competition subgame is such that the worker of quality (t) matches
with the rm of quality t.Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 13



















Proof: We characterize the equilibrium proceeding by induction. Denote by t the
class of subgames that starts with rm t having to choose among the submitted bids.
These subgames dier depending on the bids previously accepted by rms 1;:::;t 1.
We rst solve for the equilibrium of the T-th (the last) subgame in which all rms
but rm T have selected a worker's bid.
Without loss in generality, we take S = T + 1. This subgame is then a simple
decision problem for rm T that has to choose between the bids submitted by the two
remaining workers. Denote (T) and (T+1) the qualities of these two workers such
that (T) > (T+1) and B(T), respectively B(T+1), their bids. Firm T clearly chooses
the highest of these two bids.
Worker of quality (T+1) generates surplus v((T+1);T) if selected by rm T while
worker of quality (T) generates surplus v((T);T) if selected. This implies that
v((T+1);T) is worker (T+1)'s maximum willingness to bid while v((T);T) is worker
(T)'s maximum willingness to bid. Notice that from (T) > (T+1) and v1 > 0 we
have:
v((T);T) > v((T+1);T):
Worker (T) therefore submits a bid equal to the minimum necessary to outbid worker
(T+1). In other words the equilibrium bid of worker (T) coincides with the equi-
librium bid of worker (T+1): B(T) = B(T+1). Worker (T+1), on his part, has an
incentive to deviate and outbid worker (T) for any bid B(T) < v((T+1);T). There-Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 14
fore the unique equilibrium is such that both workers' equilibrium bids are:
B(T) = B(T+1) = v((T+1);T)
while, consistently with Lemma 1 above, the equilibrium match is the one between
the worker of quality (T) and the rm of quality T.7 Notice that on the equilibrium
path (T) = (T) and (T+1) = (T+1).
We now move to the t-th subgame, (t < T). In this case rm t has to choose among
the potential bids of the remaining (T   t + 2) workers of qualities (t);:::;(T+1),
where (t) > ::: > (T+1). Our induction hypothesis is that the continuation equilib-
ria of the following j = t+1;:::;T subgames are such that the worker of quality (j)



















Firm t clearly chooses the highest bid she receives.
The maximum willingness to bid of the worker of quality (t) is then exactly the
surplus generated by the match of the worker of quality (t) and rm t minus the
payo that the worker would get according to the induction hypothesis (11) by moving
to the next subgame:
v((t);t)    
W
(t) (13)
7This is just one of a whole continuum of subgame perfect equilibria of this simple Bertrand
game but the unique trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium. Trembling-hand-perfection is here used in
a completely standard way to insure that worker (T+1) does not choose an equilibrium bid (not














The maximum willingness to bid of the worker of quality (j), j = t + 1;:::;N, for
rm t is instead




(j) is dened in (11) above. Indeed, worker (j) is willing to pay the surplus
he will be able to generate if matched with rm t in excess of the payo ^ W
(j) he can
guarantee himself, from our induction hypothesis, by not competing for rm t and
moving to subgame j the only one in which his bid will be selected.
Comparing the willingness to pay of the workers of qualities (t);:::;(N) as de-
ned in (13) and (14) we obtain:
v((t);t)    
W




v((t);t)   v((t);t+1) > v((t+1);t)   v((t+1);t+1)
which is satised by the assortative matching assumption v12(;) > 0. We also
obtain:
v((j);t)    
W




v((j);t)   v((j);j) > v((j+1);t)   v((j+1);j)
which is also satised by the assortative matching assumption v12(;) > 0.
Therefore the worker of quality (t) is the one with the highest willingness to bid
for rm t followed by the worker of quality (t+1) and so on in decreasing order of
quality. Using an argument symmetric to the one presented in the analysis of the
T-th subgame, we then conclude that the equilibrium bids of worker (t) and (t+1)Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 16
are
B(t) = B(t+1) = v((t+1);t)   ^ 
W
(t+1);
while, consistently with Lemma 1 above, the equilibrium match is the one between
the worker of quality (t) and rm t. Notice that on the equilibrium path (t) = (t)
and (j) = (j). Therefore (11) and (12) coincide with (9) and (10).
Notice that Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 provide us with a number of properties
of the competition among workers for the matches.
In particular, as mentioned above, Lemma 1 shows that for given investment
choices the equilibrium allocation of workers to rms of the Bertrand game is ecient.
In other words, for given workers' investments a central planner would choose exactly
the same matches as the ones observed in equilibrium. The eciency of the allocation
that matches a worker quality (t) with a t rm follows from our assumption of positive
assortative matching.
Further from Proposition 1 above, the worker's equilibrium payo W
(t) is the sum
of the social surplus produced by the equilibrium match v((t);t) and an expression
W(t) that does not depend on the quality (t) of the worker involved in the match. In
particular this implies that W(t) does not depend on the match specic investment
x(t) of the worker of quality (t):

W
(t) = v((t);t) + W(t): (15)
The rm's equilibrium payo F
t is also the sum of two terms: the surplus generated
by the match of rm t with worker (t+1) | an inecient match if it were to occur
| and an expression Pt that does not depend on rm t's quality t:

F
t = v((t+1);t) + Pt:
These properties will play a crucial role when we analyze the eciency of the workers'
investment choices.Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 17
4.2. The Workers' Equilibrium Investments
We present now the characterization of the equilibrium of the workers' investment
game. We rst show that an equilibrium of this simultaneous move investment game
always exist and that this equilibrium is ecient: the order of the induced qualities
(i), i = 1;:::;S, coincides with the order of the workers' identities s, s = 1;:::;S.
We then show that an ineciency may arise, depending on the distribution of rms'
qualities and workers' innate abilities. This ineciency takes the form of additional
inecient equilibria, such that the order of the workers' identities diers from the
order of induced qualities.
Notice rst that each worker's investment choice is ecient given the equilib-
rium match the worker is involved in. Indeed, the Bertrand competition game will
make each worker residual claimant of the surplus produced in his equilibrium match.
Therefore, the worker is able to appropriate the marginal returns from his investment
and hence his investment choice is ecient given the equilibrium match.
Assume that the equilibrium match is the one between the s worker and the t






(s;x)   C(x) = v((s;x);t)   W(s;x)   C(x): (16)
This investment choice is dened by the following necessary and sucient rst order
conditions of problem (16):
v1((s;xs(t));t) 2(s;xs(t)) = C
0(xs(t)) (17)
where C0() is the rst derivative of the cost function C().
Notice that (17) follows from the fact that W(s;x) does not depend on worker s's
quality (s;x), and hence on worker s's match specic investment xs. The following
two lemmas derive the properties of worker s's investment choice xs(t) and his quality
(s;xs(t)).Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 18
Lemma 2. For any given equilibrium match ((s;xs(t));t) worker s's investment
choice xs(t), as dened in (17), is constrained ecient.
Proof: Notice rst that if a central planner is constrained to choose the match
between worker s and rm t worker s's constrained ecient investment is the solution




v((s;x);(t))   C(x): (18)
This investment x(s;t) is dened by the following necessary and sucient rst order






The result then follows from the observation that the denition of the constrained
ecient investment x, equation (19), coincides with the denition of worker s's
optimal investment xs(t), equation (17) above.
Lemma 3. For any given equilibrium match ((s;xs(t));t) worker s's optimally












1 v1 22   1 C00   v1 v2 12
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where the functions h and hk, h;k 2 f1;2g, are computed at (s;xs(t)); the functions
vh and vhk, h;k 2 f1;2g, are computed at ((s;xs(t));t) and C00 denotes the second
derivative of the cost function computed at xs(t).
We can now dene an equilibrium of the workers' investment game. Let (s1;:::;sS)
denote a permutation of the vector of workers' identities (1;:::;S). An equilibrium of
the workers' investment game is then a vector of investment choices xsi(i), as dened
in (17) above, such that the resulting workers' qualities have the same order as the
identity of the associated rms:
(i) = (si;xsi(i)) < (i 1) = (si 1;xsi 1(i   1)) 8i = 2;:::;S; (20)
where (i) denotes the i-th element of the equilibrium ordered vector of qualities
((1);:::;(S)).
Notice that this equilibrium denition allows for the order of workers' identities
to dier from the order of their qualities and therefore from the order of the identities
of the rms each worker is matched with.
We can now proceed to show the existence of the ecient equilibrium of the
worker investment game. This is the equilibrium characterized by the coincidence of
the order of workers' identities and the order of their qualities. From Lemma 1 the
ecient equilibrium matches are ((i;xi(i));i), i = 1;:::;N.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium of the workers' investment game characterized by
si = i, i = 1;:::;S always exists and is ecient.
Proof: We prove this result in three steps. We rst show that the workers' equilibrium
qualities (i;xi(i)) associated with the equilibrium si = i satisfy condition (20). We
then show that the net payo to worker i associated with any given quality  of
this worker is continuous in . This result is not obvious since, from Lemma 1 |
given the investment choices of other workers | worker i can change his equilibrium
match by changing his quality . Finally, we show that this net payo has a uniqueDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 20
global maximum and this maximum is such that the corresponding quality  is in the
interval in which worker i is matched with rm i. These steps clearly imply that each
worker i has no incentive to deviate and choose an investment dierent from the one
that maximizes his net payo and yields an equilibrium match with rm i.
Let W
i () C(x(i;)) be the net payo to worker i where x(i;) denotes worker
i's investment level associated with quality :
(i;x(i;))  : (21)
Step 1. Worker i's equilibrium quality (i;xi(i)) is such that:
(i;xi(i)) = (i) < (i   1;xi 1(i   1)) = (i 1); 8i = 2;:::;S:
The proof follows directly from Lemma 3 above.
Step 2. The net payo W
i ()   C(x(i;)) is continuous in .
Let ((1);:::;(i 1);(i+1);:::;(S)) be the given ordered vector of the qualities of the
workers, other than i. Notice that if  2 ((i 1);(i+1)) by Lemma 1 worker i is
matched with rm i. Then by Proposition 1 and the denition of v(;), C(), (;)
and (21) the payo function W
i ()   C(x(i;)) is continuous in .
Consider now the limit from the right, for  ! 
 
(i 1), of the net payo to worker















Conversely, if  2 ((i 1);(i 2)) then by Lemma 1 worker i is matched with rm
(i   1). Then from (9) the limit from the left, for  ! 
+
(i 1), of the net payo toDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 21






(i 1))) = v((i 1);i 1)   v((i 1);i 1) +









In this case while the worker of quality  is matched with rm i   1 the worker of
quality i 1 is matched with rm i.
Equation (22) coincides with equation (23) since the rst two terms of the left-
hand-side of equation (23) are identical. A similar argument shows continuity of the
net payo function at  = (h), h = 1;:::;i   2;i + 1;:::;N.
Step 3. The net payo W
i ()   C(x(i;)) has a unique global maximum in the
interval ((i+1);(i 1)).
Notice rst that in the interval ((i+1);(i 1)), by Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, the
net payo W
i ()   C(x(i;)) takes the following expression.
W









This expression, and therefore the net payo W
i () C(x) in the interval ((i+1);(i 1)),
is strictly concave in  (by strict concavity of v(;i), (i;) and strict convexity of
C()) and reaches a maximum at (i) = (i;xi(i)) as dened in (17) above.
Notice, further, that in the right adjoining interval ((i 1);(i 2)), by Lemma 1
and Proposition 1, the net payo W
i ()   C(x(i;)) takes the following expressionDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 22
| dierent from (24).
W
i ()   C(x(i;)) = v(;i 1)   v((i 1);i 1) +









This new expression of the net payo W
i ()   C(x(i;)) is also strictly concave
(by strict concavity of v(;i 1), (i;) and strict convexity of C()) and reaches a
maximum at (i;xi(i   1)). From Lemma 3 above we know that
(i;xi(i   1)) < (i 1) = (i   1;xi 1(i   1)):
This implies that in the interval ((i 1);(i 2)) the net payo W
i ()   C(x(i;)) is
strictly decreasing in .
A symmetric argument shows that the net payo W
i ()   C(x(i;)) is strictly
decreasing in  in any interval ((h);(h 1)) for every h = 2;:::;i   2.
Notice, further, that in the left adjoining interval ((i+2);(i+1)), by Lemma 1 and
Proposition 1, the net payo W
i ()   C(x(i;)) takes the following expression |
dierent from (24) and (25).
W









This new expression of the net payo W
i ()   C(x(i;)) is also strictly concave in
 (by strict concavity of v(;i+1), (i;) and strict convexity of C()) and reaches a
maximum at (i;xi(i + 1)) that from Lemma 3 is such that
(i+1) = (i + 1;xi+1(i + 1)) < (i;xi(i + 1)):
This implies that in the interval ((i+2);(i+1)) the net payo W
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strictly increasing in .
A symmetric argument shows that the net payo W
i ()   C(x(i;)) is strictly
increasing in  in any interval ((k+1);(k)) for every k = i + 2;:::;T   1.
The intuition behind the proof of this result is simple to describe. The payo to
worker i, W
i () C(x(i;)), changes expression as worker i increases his investment
so as to improve his quality and get matched with a higher quality rm. This pay-
o however is continuous at any point, such as (i 1), in which in the continuation
Bertrand game the worker gets matched with a dierent rm, but has a kink at such
points.8
However, if the equilibrium considered is the ecient one | si = i for every
i = 1;:::;S | the payo to worker i is monotonic decreasing in any interval to the
right of the ((i+1);(i 1)) and increasing in any interval to the left. Therefore, this
payo has a unique global maximum. Hence worker i has no incentive to deviate and
change his investment choice.
If instead we consider an inecient equilibrium | an equilibrium where s1;:::;sS
diers from 1;:::;S | then the payo to worker i is still continuous at any point, such
as (si;xsi(i)), in which in the continuation Bertrand game the worker gets matched
with a dierent rm. However, this payo is not any more monotonic decreasing in
any interval to the right of the ((si+1;xsi+1(i+1));(si 1;xsi 1(i 1))) and increasing
in any interval to the left. In particular, this payo is increasing at least in the right
neighborhood of the switching points (sh;xsh(h)) for h = 1;:::;i 1 and decreasing
in the left neighborhood of the switching points (sk;xsk(k)) for k = i + 1;:::;N.
This implies that depending on the values of parameters these inecient equilibria
may or may not exist. We show below that for given rms' qualities it is possible to
construct inecient equilibria if two workers' qualities are close enough. Alternatively,
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for given workers' qualities inecient equilibria do not exist if the rms qualities are
close enough.
Proposition 3. Given any ordered vector of rms' qualities (1;:::;T), it is possible
to construct an inecient equilibrium of the workers' investment game such that there
exists at least an i such that si < si 1.
Moreover, given any vector of workers' quality functions ((s1;);:::;(sS;)), it
is possible to construct an ordered vector of rms' qualities (1;:::;T) such that
there does not exist any inecient equilibrium of the workers' investment game.
Proof: First, for a given ordered vector of rms' qualities (1;:::;T) we construct
an inecient equilibrium of the workers' investment game such that there exist one
worker, labelled sj, j 2 f2;:::;Sg, such that sj < sj 1.
To show that a vector (s1;:::;sj;:::;sS) is an equilibrium of the workers' invest-
ment game we need to verify that condition (20) holds for every i = 2;:::;S and
no worker si has an incentive to deviate and choose an investment x dierent from
xsi(i), as dened in (16).
Notice rst that for every worker, other than sj and sj 1 Proposition 2 above
applies and hence it is an equilibrium for each worker to choose investment level
xsi(i), as dened in (16), such that (20) is satised.
We can therefore restrict attention on worker sj and sj 1. In particular we need
to consider a worker sj 1 of a quality arbitrarily close to the one of worker sj. This
is achieved by considering a sequence of quality functions n(sj 1;) that converges
uniformly to (sj;).9 Then from denition (16), the continuity and strict concavity
of v(;) and (s;), the continuity and strict convexity of C() and the continuity of
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v1(;), 2(s;) and C0() for any given " > 0 there exists an index n" such that from
every n > n":
 
n(sj 1;xsj 1(j   1))   (sj;xsj(j   1))
  < ": (27)
From Lemma 3 and the assumptions sj > sj 1 we also know that for every n > n":

n(sj 1;xsj 1(i   1)) < (sj;xsj(j   1)): (28)
While from the assumption j < j 1 we have that:
(sj;xsj(j)) < (sj;xsj(j   1)): (29)
Inequalities (27), (28) and (29) imply that for any worker sj 1 characterized by the
quality function n(sj 1;) where n > n", the equilibrium condition (20) is satised:
(sj;xsj(j)) < 
n(sj 1;xsj 1(j   1)): (30)
To conclude that (s1;:::;sj;:::;sS) is an equilibrium of the workers' investment
game we still need to show that neither worker sj nor worker sj 1 want to deviate a
choose an investment dierent from xsj(j) and xsj 1(j 1), where the quality function
associated with worker sj 1 is n(sj 1;) for n > n".
Consider the net payo to worker sj: W
sj () C(x(sj;)). An argument symmetric
to the one used in Step 2 of Proposition 2 shows that this payo function is continuous
in . Moreover, from the denition of (j), Lemma 3, (28) and (30) we obtain that
(j) < 
n
(j 1) < (sj;xsj(j   1)) < (j 2):
Then using an argument symmetric to the one used in Step 3 of the proof of Propo-
sition 2 we conclude that this net payo function has two local maxima at (j) and
(sj;xsj(j 1)) and a kink at n
(j 1). We then need to show that there exist at least an
element of the sequence n
(j 1) such that the net payo W
sj ()   C(x(sj;)) reaches
a global maximum at (j). Therefore when the quality function of worker sj 1 isDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 26
n(sj 1;) worker sj has no incentive to deviate and choose a dierent investment.
From (9) the net payo W
sj () C(x(sj;)) computed at (j) is greater than the
















Inequality (27) above and the continuity of v(;j 1), (sj;) and C() imply that for
any given " > 0 there exist a " and a n" such that for every n > n"
 v((sj;xsj(j   1));j 1)   v(
n
(j 1);j 1)
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We can now conclude that there exist an " > 0 such that for every n > n" condition
(32) is satised with strict inequality. This is because (by strict concavity of v(;j),
(sj;) and strict convexity of C()) the function v(;j)   C (x(sj;)) is strictly
concave and has a unique interior maximum at (j).
Consider now the net payo to worker sj 1: W
sj 1()   C(x(sj 1;)). An argu-
ment symmetric to the one used above allow us to prove that this payo function is
continuous in . Further, from the denition of (j), Lemma 3, and (30) we have that
(j+1) < 
n(sj 1;xsj 1(j)) < (j) < 
n
(j 1):
Therefore we conclude that this net payo function has two local maxima at n
(j 1)
and n(sj 1;xsj 1(j)) and a kink at (j). We still need to prove that there exist atDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 27
least an element of the sequence n
(j 1) such that the net payo W
sj 1() C(x(sj 1;))
reaches a global maximum at n
(j 1) which implies that when the quality function of
worker sj 1 is n(sj 1;) this worker has no incentive to deviate and choose a dierent
investment.
From (9) the net payo W
sj 1() C(x(sj 1;)) computed at n
(j 1) is greater than
the same net payo computed at n(sj 1;xsj 1(j)) if and only if
v(n












Denition (16), the continuity and strict concavity of v(;j) and (sj 1;), the con-
tinuity and strict convexity of C() and the continuity of v1(;j), 2(sj;) and C0()




  < "
0;
while for every n > n"0
 v((j);j)   v(
n(sj 1;xsj 1(j));j)
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We can now conclude that there exists a "0 > 0 such that for every n > n"0 condition
(34) is satised with strict inequality. This is because (by strict concavity of v(;j 1),
n(sj 1;) and strict convexity of C()) the function v(;j 1)   C (x(sj 1;)) is
strictly concave and has a unique interior maximum at n
(j 1).
This concludes the construction of the inecient equilibrium of the workers' in-Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 28
vestment game.
We need now to show that for any given vector of workers' quality functions
((s1;);:::;(sS;)) it is possible to construct an ordered vector of rms qualities
(1;:::;T) such that no inecient equilibrium exist.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that an inecient equilibrium exists for any
ordered vector of rms' qualities (1;:::;T). Consider rst the case in which this
inecient equilibrium is such that there exist only one worker sj such that sj < sj 1.
Let n
j 1 be a sequence of quality levels of rm (j   1) such that n
j 1 > j and n
j 1
converges to j.
From Lemma 3 and the assumption sj > sj 1 we have that
(sj;xsj(j)) > (sj 1;xsj 1(j)) (35)
where xsj(j) and xsj 1(j) are dened in (16). Further, denote xn
sj 1(j 1) the optimal













Then from Lemma 3 we have that
(sj 1;x
n
sj 1(j   1)) > (sj 1;xsj 1(j)): (36)
Further, continuity of the functions v(;), v1(;), (s;), 2(s;), C() and C0()
imply that for given ^ " > 0 there exist an n^ " such that for every n > n^ "
  (sj 1;x
n
sj 1(j   1))   (sj 1;xsj 1(j))
   < ^ ": (37)
Then from (35), (36) and (37) there exists an ^ " > 0 and hence an n^ " such that for
every n > n^ "
(sj;xsj(j)) > (sj 1;x
n
sj 1(j   1)): (38)
Inequality (38) clearly contradicts the necessary condition (20) for the existence ofDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 29
the inecient equilibrium.
A similar construction leads to a contradiction in the case the inecient equilib-
rium is characterized by more than one worker sj such that sj < sj 1.
The intuition behind this result is simple. The continuity of each worker's payo
implies that when two workers have similar innate abilities exactly as it is not optimal
for each worker to deviate when he is matched eciently it is also not optimal for
him to deviate when he is ineciently assigned to a match. Indeed, the dierence in
workers' qualities is almost entirely determined by the dierence in rms' qualities
rather than by the dierence in workers' innate ability.
Conversely, if rms' qualities are similar then the dierence in workers qualities is
almost entirely explained by the dierence in workers' innate abilities implying that
it is not possible to construct an inecient equilibrium of the workers' investment
game. The reason being that the improvement in the worker's incentives to invest
due to a match with a better rm are more than compensated by the decrease in the
worker's incentives induced by a lower innate ability of the worker. Hence it is not
optimal for two workers of decreasing innate abilities to generate increasing qualities
so as to be matched with increasing quality rms.
We then conclude that when workers are undertaking ex-ante match specic in-
vestments and then Bertrand compete for a match with a rm investments are con-
strained ecient. However, if workers are similar in innate ability ineciencies may
arise that take the form of additional equilibria characterized by inecient matches.
Hence the higher is the degree of specicity due to the workers' characteristics with
respect to the specicity due to the rms' characteristics the less likely is this ine-
ciency.
5. Firm's investments
We move now to the model in which the qualities of workers are exogenously given
s = (s) while the qualities of rms are a function of rms' ex-ante match spe-
cic investments y and the rm's identity t: (t;y). In this model we show that
rms' investments are not any more constrained ecient. Firms under-invest sinceDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 30
their marginal incentives to undertake investments are determined by their outside
option that depends on the surplus of the match between the rm and the immediate
competitor to the worker the rm is matched with in equilibrium (a strictly lower sur-
plus than the equilibrium one). However, we are able to provide an upper-bound on
the aggregate ineciency of the under-investment. Indeed, aggregate ineciency is
strictly lower than the ineciency that would be generated in the same environment
if the best rm matches with the best worker in isolation. In other words, competition
strictly decreases the ineciency due to the hold-up problem.
Furthermore, as a counterpart to this `near eciency' result we show that equi-
librium matches are always ecient: the order of rms innate abilities coincides with
the order of their derived qualities. In other words, all coordination problems are
solved and no inecient equilibrium arise.
5.1. Equilibrium Characterization of the Bertrand Competition Game
We solve our model backward and start from the Bertrand competition game as
described in Section 3 above. Assume that rms investments are given so as to
obtain an ordered vector of rms' qualities ((1);:::;(T)) where (h) < (h 1) for
every h = 2;:::;T. The ordered vector of workers' qualities is instead (1;:::;S),
where k < k 1 for every k = 2;:::;S.
The analysis of the Bertrand competition subgame diers from the one presented
in the section above. Indeed, the order in which rms choose among bids in this
subgame is determined by the rms' identities rather than by their qualities. This
implies that unless rms' qualities (which are endogenously determined) have the
same order of rms' identities it is possible that rms do not choose among bids
in the decreasing order of their marginal contribution to a match (at least o the
equilibrium path). Therefore competition among rms for each match might not be
maximized as it was necessarily the case on and o the equilibrium path in the model
in which the workers make ex-ante investments.
We start by showing that as in Section 4.1 above equilibrium matches are ecient
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to Lemma 1 above.
Lemma 4. Given an ordered vector ((1);:::;(S)) every equilibrium of the Bertrand
competition subgame is characterized by the equilibrium matches: (k;(k)), for every
k = 1;:::;T.
Proof: Assume by way of contradiction that this is not the case and there exist a
pair of equilibrium matches (0;(i)) and (00;(j)) such that i < j, or (i) > (j), and
0 < 00. Denote B((i)), respectively B((j)), the bids that in equilibrium the rm of
quality (i), respectively of quality (j), accepts.
Consider rst the match (00;(i)). For this match to occur in equilibrium we need
that it is not convenient for the worker of quality 00 to match with the rm of quality
(j) rather than (i). If worker 00 deviates and does not submit a bid that will be
selected by rm (i) then two situations may occur depending on whether the rm of
quality (i) chooses her bid before or after the rm of quality (j). In particular if (i)
chooses her bid before (j) then following the deviation of the worker of quality 00 a
dierent worker will be matched with rm (i). As in the proof of Lemma 1 above this
may reduce the bids submitted to the rm of quality (j) of exactly one bid reducing
the maximum of these bids ^ B((j)) that the worker of quality 00 need to submit so
as to be matched, following his deviation, with the rm of quality (j). This implies
the following necessary condition for (00;(i)) to be an equilibrium match.
v(
00;(i))   B((i))  v(
00;(j))   B((j)) (39)
Alternatively if (i) chooses her bid after (j) then for (00;(i)) to be an equilibrium
match we need that worker 00 does not nd convenient to deviate and outbid the
worker of quality 0 by submitting bid B((j). This equilibrium condition therefore
coincides with (39) above.
Consider now the equilibrium match (0;(j)). For this match to occur in equilib-
rium we need that the worker of quality 0 does not want to deviate and be matchedDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 32
with the rm of quality (i) rather than (j). As discussed above, depending on whether
(j) chooses her bid before or after (i), the following is a necessary or a necessary and
sucient condition for (0;(j)) to be an equilibrium match.
v(
0;(j))   B((j))  v(
0;(i))   B((i)): (40)






Condition (41) contradicts the assortative matching assumption v12(;) > 0.
Having established this property we can now move to the characterization of the
unique equilibrium of the Bertrand competition game.
Consider rst the match between the rm of identity (innate ability) t with the
worker of identity s or quality s. We dene the level of investment yt(s) as follows
yt(s) =argmax
y
v(s;(t;y))   C(y): (42)
In other words, yt(s) is dened by the following necessary and sucient condition:
v2(s;(t;yt(s))) 2(t;yt(s)) = C
0(yt(s)): (43)
Notice then that, in contrast with what we did in Section 4 above, we cannot here
solve fort the Bertrand competition game without solving at the same time for the
rms' investment game. Indeed, the workers' bids depend on the rms' investment
choice. In other words the Bertrand competition game diers depending on the
relative size of each rm's investment choice.
Proposition 4. The unique equilibrium of the Bertrand competition subgame in
the case in which rms undertake ex-ante investments is such that 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investment yt(t + 1), as dened in (43), generates quality (t;yt(t + 1)) = t, and
matches with worker t of quality t, t = 1;:::;T.






[v(h;h)   v(h+1;h)] (44)

F
(t) = v(t+1;t)  
T X
h=t+1
[v(h;h)   v(h+1;h)]: (45)
Proof: We prove this result in three steps. We rst show that if rms choose invest-
ments yt(t + 1), for t = 1;:::;T, (labelled simple investments, for convenience) then
the order of rms' identities coincides with the inverse order of rms' qualities. We
then proceed to show that in this case the equilibrium matches are such that worker
t matches with rm t, for every t = 1;:::;T, and the shares of the surplus accruing
to each worker and each rm are the ones dened in (44) and (45) above. We then
conclude the proof by showing that the unique equilibrium of the rms' investment
subgame is for rm t to choose the simple investment yt(t + 1), t = 1;:::;T.
Step 1. If each rm t chooses the simple investment yt(t + 1), as dened in (42),
then
1 = (1;y1(2)) > ::: > T = (T;yT(T + 1)):




v2 1 22   1 C00   v2 2 12






v22(2)2 + v2 22   C00 < 0 (47)
where (with an abuse of notation) we denote with h and hk, h;k 2 f1;2g the rst
and second order derivatives of the quality functions 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Moreover the rst and second order derivative (vh and vhk, h;k 2 f1;2g) of the
functions v(;) are computed at (s;(t;yt(s))).
Step 2. If rms' investments are such that 1 > ::: > T then rm t is matched with
worker t, t = 1;:::;T and the shares of surplus to each worker and each rm are the
ones specied in (44) and (45).
Notice that since 1 > ::: > T and 1 > :::S then from Lemma 4 rm t
matches with worker t, t = 1;:::;T. Moreover Proposition 1 above applies and hence
the shares of surplus to each worker and each rm in (9) and (10) coincides with the
shares in (44) and (45).
Step 3. The unique equilibrium of the rms' investment subgame is such that rm
t chooses the simple investment yt(t + 1) for every t = 1;:::;T.
We prove this result starting from rm T. In the T-th (the last) subgame of the
Bertrand competition game all rms, but rm T, have selected a worker's bid. Denote
T the quality of this rm.
Assume for simplicity that S = T + 1. We use the same notation as in the proof
of Proposition 1 above. In particular since we want to show that rm T chooses a
simple investment independently from the investment choice of the other rms we
denote (T) and (T+1) the qualities of the two workers that are still un-matched in
the T-th subgame, such that (T) > (T+1). Indeed, from Lemma 4 the identity of
the two workers left will depend on the order of rms' qualities and therefore on the
investment choices of the other (T   1) rms.
From Step 2 above we have that the worker of quality (T) matches with rm




and the payo of the worker of quality (T+1) is zero.
Denote now a(T), respectively a(T+1), the identity of the workers of quality (T),




v((T + 1);(T;y))   C(y):
This implies that the optimal investment of rm T is the simple investment yT =
yT(a(T+1)), as dened in (43), whatever is the pair of workers left in the T-th subgame.
If all other rms undertake a simple investment then from Step 1: a(T) = T and
a(T+1) = T + 1. Hence rm T's optimal investment is yT(T + 1).
Denote now t + 1, (t < T), the last rm that undertakes a simple investment
yt+1(t + 2). We then show that also rm t will choose a simple investment yt(t + 1).
Consider the t-th subgame in which rm t has to choose among the potential bids
of the remaining (T   t + 2) workers labelled a(t) < ::: < a(T+1), with associated
qualities (t) > ::: > (T+1), respectively.10 From the assumption that every rm
j = t+1;:::;T undertakes a simple investment yj((j+1)) and Step 1 we obtain that
t+1 > ::: > T. We rst show that the quality associated with rm t is such that
t > t+1.
Assume by way of contradiction that rm t chooses investment y that yields a
quality  such that j+1    j for some j 2 ft + 1;:::;T   1g. Then from

















v((j + 1);(t;y))   C(y): (49)
From the assumption that all rm j 2 ft+1;:::;Tg undertakes a simple investment
and denition (42) we also have that rm j's investment choice yj(a(j+1)) is dened
10Once again we want to show that rm t undertakes a simple investment independently of the
investment choice of rms 1;:::;t 1 that determines the exact identities of the un-matched workers




v((j + 1);(j;y))   C(y): (50)
Notice further that the payo to rm t in (48) is continuous in . Indeed the limit
for  that converges from the right to j is equal to

F







If instead j <   j 1 then from Step 2 the payo to the rm with quality  is
F









Therefore the limit for  that converges to j from the left is, from (52), equal to F
j
in (51). This proves the continuity in  of the payo function in (48).
Continuity of the payo function in (48) together with denitions (49), (50) and
condition (46) imply that y > yj(a(j+1) or  > j a contradiction to the hypothesis
  j.
We now show that rm t will choose a simple investment yt((t+1)). From the result
we just obtained t > t+1 > ::: > T and the assumption that (t) > ::: > (S)
are the qualities of the unmatched workers in the t-th subgame of the Bertrand
competition game we conclude, using Step 2 above, that the payo to rm t is:

F







Firm t's investment choice is then the simple investment yt(a(t+1) dened as follows:
yt(a(t+1) =argmax
y
v((t + 1);(t;y))   C(y): (54)
To conclude that a simple investment yt(a(t+1)) is the unique equilibrium choice forDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 37
rm t in the rms' investment game we still need to show that rm t has no incentive to
deviate and choose an investment y, and hence a quality , that exceeds the quality
k of one of the (t   1) rms that are already matched at the t-th subgame of the
Bertrand competition game: k < t. The reason why this choice of investment might
be optimal for rm t is that it changes the pool of workers a(t);:::;a(S) unmatched in
subgame t. Of course this choice will change the simple nature of rm t's investment
only if k > t+1. Indeed we already showed that if k < t+1 then t > k and from
(54) rm t's investment choice is yt(a(t+1)) a simple investment for any given set of
unmatched workers.
Consider the following deviation by rm t: rm t chooses an investment y >
yt(a(t+1)) that yields quality  > k > t+1. Recall that Lemma 4 implies that the
ranking of each rm in the ordered vector of rms' qualities determines the worker
each rm is allocated to. Hence, rm t's deviation changes the ranking and the
allocation of all rms whose quality  is smaller than  and greater than t+1. How-
ever, this deviation does not alter the ranking of the T + 1   t rms with identities
(t + 1;:::;T) and qualities (t+1;:::;T). Therefore, the only dierence between the
set of un-matched workers in the t-th subgame of the Bertrand competition game
on the equilibrium path and the set of un-matched workers in the same subgame
following rm t's deviation is the identity and quality of the worker that matches
with rm t.11 The remaining set of workers' identities and qualities ((t+1);:::;(S))
is unchanged.
Hence, following rm t's deviation the un-matched workers' qualities are  >
(t+1) > ::: > (T), where  is the quality of the worker that according to Lemma 4
is matched with rm t when the quality of this rm is . Step 2 implies that rm











11Recall that all rms with identities (k;:::;t 1) have already been matched in the t-th subgame
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Continuity of the payo function in (54) together with (55) imply that rm t's net pay-
o is maximized at yt(a(t+1)). Hence, rm t cannot gain from choosing an investment
y > yt(a(t+1). This proves that rm t will choose a simple investment yt(a(t+1)). This
argument holds for every t < T implying that all rm choose a simple investment.
Therefore a(t) = t and rm t's equilibrium investment choice is yt = yt(t + 1).
Notice that the same eciency properties we discuss in relation to Proposition 1
hold in this case as well.
As in the sequential investment case, the worker's equilibrium payo W(t;t;yt;xt)
is equal to the sum of the social surplus, v(t;t;yt;xt) and an expression Wt that does
not depend on worker t's match specic investment xt:

W(t;t;yt;xt) = v(t;t;yt;xt) + Wt: (56)
Similarly, the rm's equilibrium payo F(t;t;yt;xt) is the sum of the surplus gen-
erated by the (inecient) match of rm t with worker (t + 1) and an expression Pt
that does not depend on rm t's match-specic investment yt:

F(t;t;yt;xt) = v(t;t + 1;yt;xt+1) + Pt: (57)
5.2. The Ineciencies of Non-Sequential Investment
In Section 5 above we have argued that the agents on the side of the market that
is responsible for bidding for matches in the Bertrand competition game make con-
strained ecient ex-ante investments.12 In our model, these are the workers. This
section analyses the potential ineciencies that arise if rms also make ex-ante in-
vestments that precede the Bertrand competition game.
For sake of simplicity denote w(;t;y) the net surplus to rm t when it matches
12The constraint on the workers' investment choices is represented by the rms' investment choices
that a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with the worker of quality :
w(t;s;y) = v(t;s;y)   C(y)
Further recall that we assume that this net surplus function satises the \respon-
sive complementarity" assumptions as stated in (2) above.
From Proposition 4 we know that the return to rm t is given, from (57), by:

F(t;t;yt) = w(t;t + 1;yt) + Pt (58)
where Pt depends upon investments made by rms of a higher identity than t. If rm
t must make an ex-ante investment then, recognising that competition will follow
leading to the return given by (58), yt will be chosen to maximize (58) and we have:13
yt =argmax
y
w(t;t + 1;y) (59)
On the other hand, eciency calls for the maximization of total surplus. As the
surplus from the match between rm t and worker t is w(t;t;yt), eciency requires

















How large is this loss L? First, notice that the dierence between y
t and yt is
13Notice that if the argument x is not suppressed in the function w(;;;) then (59) below denes
rm t's reaction function y(t;t;x). Our complementarity and concavity assumption on the surplus
function imply that y(t;t;x) is strictly monotonic in x and the Nash equilibrium of this investment
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approximately proportional to the dierence in characteristics between worker t and
t + 1 (given that y is dierentiable in s). On the other hand, as y
t solves (60) , the
dierence between w(t;t;yt) and w(t;t;y
t) will be approximately proportional to the
square of the dierence between yt and y
t which will be small if worker t and worker
t+1 have similar characteristics. To give an example of how this aects L, consider a
situation where the characteristics of a worker are captured by a real number c with
workers 0 through T having characteristics which are evenly spaced between c and
c. How is L aected by the size of the market T? The dierence between y
t and yt
is approximately proportional to (c   c)=T and the dierence between w(t;t;yt) and
w(t;t;y
t) will be approximately proportional to [(c   c)=T]
2 : Summing over t then
gives a total loss L that is proportional to (c   c)
2 =T: in large markets the aggregate
ineciency created by ex-ante investment will be arbitrarily small.14
This is a result that changes the degree of specicity of the workers' investment
choices. Increasing the number and hence the density of rms evenly spaced in the
interval [c;c] is equivalent to introducing rms with closer and closer characteristics.
This is equivalent to reducing the loss in productivity generated by the match of
a worker that made a given investment with the rm that is immediately below
in characteristics levels. Hence, there is a sense in which this result is not fully
satisfactory since we know that if the worker's investment is general in nature the
rms' investment choices are ecient.
Therefore, in the rest of this section, we identify an upper-bound on the aggregate
ineciency present in the economy that is independent of the number of rms and
does not alter the specicity of the workers investment choices. Whatever the size of
T, it is possible to get a precise upper-bound on the loss L. Indeed, the ineciency
created by the rms' ex-ante under-investment is less than that which could be created
by the under-investment of only one rm (the best 1) in a match with a worker (the
worst T).
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Proposition 5. Assume that there are at least two rms (T  2). Let M be
the eciency loss resulting from rm 1 choosing an investment level given by ~ y =
argmaxy w(1;T + 1;y) :
M = w(1;1;y

1)   w(1;1; ~ y): (62)
If types and investments are complementary (in a sense that second cross-partial
derivatives are positive and (2) is satised) then
L < M: (63)
Proof: If y(t;s) is the ecient investment level when worker of type s is matched














w(1;1;y(1;t + 1)) (65)
so that









w(1;1;y(1;t + 1))   w(t;t;y(t;t + 1))
io (66)
Dene a function f as
ft(;) = w(t   ;t   ;y(t   ;t + )) (67)
so that (66) becomes
M   L =
T X
t=1
f[ft(0;t   1)   ft(0;0)]   [ft(1;t   1)   ft(1;0)]g (68)Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 42
From (68), it is clear that, as T > 1, each bracketed term in the summation will




which, using (67), corresponds to
d =  y2 (w23 + w13 + w33 y1)   w3 y12 < 0 (70)
with each derivative on the right-hand-side of (70) being evaluated at (t ;t ;y)
where y is evaluated at (t   ;t + ).
To investigate the actual sign of d, we must investigate the function y(t;s) which
is dened by (4). Dierentiating (4) and denoting the evaluation of each derivative


















^ w323 ^ w13
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 
^ w133 ^ w23
^ w33
+




















^ w233 ^ w13
^ w33
 
^ w133 ^ w23
^ w33
+












so the rst term is negative (recall that w23 < 0 and w33 < 0). Taking the secondDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 43
bracketed term, (2) again implies that









so that the term in brackets is positive and, as w is evaluated at a point of under-
investment, we have w3 > 0 which together with ^ w33 < 0 ensures that the second
term in (74) is also negative. Thus d is negative: every term in the summation of
(66) is positive and so M > L: the overall eciency loss in the market is less than
that which is possible by the under-investment of a single rm.
The intuition of Proposition 5 can be described as follows. As a result of the
Bertrand competition game rms have incentive to invest in match specic invest-
ments with the purpose of improving their outside option: the maximum willingness
to pay of the immediate competitor for the worker they match with. This implies
that the under-investment of each rm is relatively small. The total ineciency is
then obtained by aggregating these relatively small under-investments. Given the
decreasing returns to investment and the assumptions on how optimal rms' invest-
ments change across dierent matches, the sum of the loss in surplus generated by
these almost optimal investments is clearly dominated by the loss in surplus gener-
ated by the unique under-investment of the best rm matched with the worst worker.
Indeed, the rm's investment choice in the latter case is very far from the optimal
level (returns from a marginal increase of investment are very high).
6. Concluding Remarks
When both sides to a market can undertake match specic investments Bertrand
competition between these sides (workers and rms) for matches may help solve the
hold-up problems generated by the absence of fully contingent contracts. In this
paper, we have shown two results, quite dierent in their nature.
When workers choose investments that precede Bertrand competition then theDoes Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem? 44
workers' investment choices are constrained ecient. However, ineciencies may
arise that take the form of multiple equilibria. One of these equilibria is leads to
ecient matches. However there may exist inecient equilibria characterized by the
dierence between the order of workers' innate abilities and the order of their derived
qualities.
If instead rms choose investments that precede the Bertrand competition game a
dierent type of ineciencies may arise. The equilibrium of the Bertrand competition
game is unique and ecient: the order of rms' qualities coincide with the order of
their innate abilities. However, rms choose an inecient level of investment given
the equilibrium match they are involved in. In this case, however, we are able to
show that the aggregate ineciency due to rms' under-investments is low in the
sense that is bounded above by the ineciency that would be induced by the sole
under-investment of the best rm matched with the worst worker. In other words
rms' investment choices are near ecient.
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